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Poetry and Emphatic Truth:
Walter Benjamin’s Reading of Hölderlin1
Poesía y Verdad enfática:
La lectura de Hölderlin por Benjamin
Richard Eldridge
Resumen
El presente trabajo comenta la teoría poética de Walter Benjamin. Se hace notar que
Benjamin sigue a Hölderlin al considerar que un verdadero poema es una configuración
particular en la que se juntan los órdenes intelectual y perceptivo. Un verdadero
poema aspiraría no a la verdad como correspondencia con un objeto determinado,
sino a algo que en el texto se describe como “verdad enfática”.

Palabras clave: Walter Benjamin, Hölderlin, verdad enfática, crítica literaria
Abstract
Benjamin’s poetic theory is commented. It is noted that Benjamin follows Hölderlin
in regarding a successful poem as a particular configuration that joins the intellectual
and perceptual orders. Such a successful poem aims at and can possess not truth as
correspondence to a given object, but rather what in the text is described as “emphatic
truth”.

Keywords: Walter Benjamin, Hölderlin, emphatic truth, literary criticism
In a letter to Martin Buber in July, 1916, Benjamin criticizes a view of the
“relationship between language and action in which the former [is merely]
an instrument of the latter,” and he proposes instead to understand “writing
[Schrifttum] as such as poetic, prophetic, objective in terms of its effect, but in

This text is a section from my book Images of History: Kant, Benjamin, Freedom, and the Human
Subject, forthcoming (Fall 2016) from Oxford University Press.
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any case only as magical [magisch], that is as un-mediated [un-mittel-bar].”2 As both the
context of a letter to Buber (against a background of discussions of Kabbalah
with Scholem) and the word “Schrifttum,” which describes professional, learned,
or sacred texts, in contrast with the more colloquial “Schreiben” for writings in
general, suggest, Benjamin is here concerned with a particular and specialized
kind of writing, not with all written texts, in particular with a kind of writing that
can be prophetically effective for action in relation to fundamental issues of life.
Somewhat paradoxically, this specialized form of writing wins its effectiveness
through “the crystal-pure elimination of the ineffable [die kristallreine Elimination
des Unsagbaren]”: “only where this sphere of speechlessness [diese Sphäre des
Wortlosen] reveals itself in unutterably pure power can the magic spark leap between
the word and the active deed [bewegender Tat], where the unity of these two is
immediately actual.”3 Benjamin’s modernist distaste for instrumentalist planning
and for decoration, ornamentation, and personal expression plus his contrasting
preference for exactness of description are already here fully developed and on
display. As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe remarks about this letter, “this page contains
the poetic art of Benjamin, [and] he remained faithful to it in all he wrote.”4
As well as being broadly derived from a concept of the sacred object, the
general idea of a work of literary art as effective through the achievement of
presence is prominent in the German tradition at least as far back as Lessing’s 1766
essay Laocoön, where, while in the first instance sharply differentiating the effects
and techniques that are proper to the distinctive media of painting and poetry,
Lessing also goes on to pose as a normative demand for poetry the achievement
of the “painterly [malerisch],” a “combination of features by means of which
the poet makes his subject so perceptible that we are more clearly conscious
of this subject than of his words.”5 The achievement of such presence in the
work affords the reader an experience of absorption in the work as it presents its
subject. The presentation of the subject in the work is hence anschaulich or intuitive
in guiding the reader’s attention to just this thing, presented in just this way there,
not primarily discursive or classificatory. The painterliness that the successful
poem achieves in its sensuous presence to the reader falls under the heading of
Anschaulichkeit: an imagistic clarity or understandability, where one engages with

Benjamin (2012, p. 80); GS Briefe I, p. 126.
Ibid., p. 80; GS Briefe I, p. 127 (translation modified.)
4
Lacoue-Labarthe (2002, p. 12).
5
Lessing (2003, p. 79).
2
3
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both the work and its presented subject matter by way of the focus of perception
on a this. At the same time, however, just in virtue of requiring and affording a
temporally extended experience of reading, the literary work that achieves this
kind of Anschaulichkeit also requires intellectual and discursive activity on the part
of the reader, who further has available the possibility of reflection throughout
the experience of reading.
Describing this achievement and characterizing its importance philosophically
is a major topic of Hölderlin’s poetic theorizing, where he emphasizes the
importance of harmonious alternation in the experience of the successful poem
between free reflection and absorption in sensuous presentation. “The foundation
and significance of the poem… lies between the expression (presentation) and
the free idealistic treatment.… This is what lends the poems its seriousness,
its firmness, its truth; it protects the poem [by assuring] that the free idealistic
treatment [--the thematization that is taken up in the reader’s reflections--] become
not an empty affectation, and the presentation [of the particular subject in just
this way] become not vanity.”6 Both potentially empty, free, idealistic moralizing,
untethered to sensuous experience of an existing object and potentially vain,
gratuitous, wallowing in the object or in the words that sensuously present it,
without reflective thought, are to be avoided. The point of constructing a poem
that embodies Anschaulichkeit in living alternation with thematic materials for
reflection is to find oneself, either as reader or writer, at home in one’s world,
at least for a moment, as both an active and a natural, embodied being. Or, in
Hölderlin’s formulation, the successful poem answers to the need of the I—the
human subject as such—“to recognize its unity [as a reflective, active subject]
in the harmoniously opposed [--the object of configured attention--] and [to
recognize] the subjective (harmoniously opposed) in its unity [as an object formed
for its attentions].”7 An experienced object that supports a successfully modulated
poem as a form of attention to it thus functions, in Thomas Pfau’s useful phrase,
as a vehicle of “analeptic Ahndung” or restorative presentiment.8
Hölderlin (1988, p. 66).
Ibid., p. 75.
8
Pfau (1988, p. 28). “Ahndung” is Hölderlin’s archaic, Swabian spelling of “Ahnung”;
“analeptic” is a medical term meaning “restorative” or “stimulative.” The object that is
experienced in and through the poem is more than either a thing simply recognized under
a concept or a source of immediate sense experience. Instead it is an an object that is both
received and attended to, in such a way that the experiencing subject feels more fully its powers
as a subject as potentially effective in relation to empirical life.
6
7
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Following Hölderlin, Benjamin develops his own poetic theory in his 191415 “Two Poems by Friedrich Hölderlin.” Like Hölderlin, Benjamin regards the
successful poem as a “particular configuration [besondere Gestalt] that joins “the
intellectual and perceptual orders.”9 Given the assumption, as Benjamin puts it
in his 1919 “Fate and Character,” that “between the active man and the external
world, all is interaction [Wechselwirkung]; their spheres of action interpenetrate,”10
a successful poem, as a depiction not of empirical objects as such, but of human
experience and of human being in relation to empirical objects, must join the
intellectual and perceptual orders, in presenting a process of interaction that
involves both perceptual intake and intellectual reflection. Unlike the depiction
of empirical objects in relation to each other and apart from human involvement,
so far as this is possible and achieved in either natural science or mere recognitive
perception, for Benjamin, “the act of poetizing” has, in Fenves’ formulation, “an
objective intention [that] is categorically different from any other act, …. [where]
the ‘truth’ of poetry is not understood as the correspondence between thinking
and being or between subject and object but, rather, in terms of ‘fulfillment’
(Erfüllung), on the one hand, and ‘objectivity’ (Gegenständlichkeit), on the other.”11
The successful poem must present, in Hölderlinian terms, a modulated sequence
or alternation of thoughts and perceptions that are bound together in attending
to an object.12
This distinctive objective intention or aim to be realized in successful poetizing
is not limited only to lyric poetry. It covers other forms of modern literary art,
such as drama and the novel. Given that literary reading itself involves active,
modulated, perceptual, and reflective attention to a work, seeking orientation in
relation to the experience of it, just as orientation is sought within the literary
work in its attention to its object, this distinctive objective intention covers the
aim of criticism, too.13 As Winfried Menninghaus puts it, explicating and citing
Benjamin’s doctoral dissertation on German Romanticism,
Benjamin (2002, p. 19); GS II, 1, p. 106.
Benjamin (2002a, p. 202); GS II, 1, p. 173.
11
Fenves (2010, p. 23).
12
See Hölderlin’s thought that “poetic life with respect to its content remains …essentially
unified … [insofar as] it exists as such in definite form and progresses through the alternation
of moods where each time the succeeding mood is determined by the preceding one” (1988,
p. 68).
13
Though it is present already in Benjamin’s Hölderlin essay, this idea is not directly derived
from Hölderlin, for whom poetry was sharply distinct from both criticism and philosophy. The
9

10
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As a representation of works based on their own features, critique is not a judgmental
‘reflecting on a work of art’, but rather a consciousness-raising ‘unfolding’, in a
new formation, of that ‘reflection’ which itself already exists in the work as its
structural principle. Both work and critique are thefore ‘relative’ moments in the
same medium of reflection.14

Within both poetry and criticism, the fulfillment and objectivity (Erfüllung
and Gegenständlichkeit) that are sought involve a fullness in both presenting and
embodying a modulated but incomplete experience that fails, necessarily, fully
to capture a given, discrete object for a given, discrete subject. In presenting a
modulated but open alternation of perceptions and reflections, the successful
poetical and critical work embodies what Benjamin came in his Goethe essay
to call a Wahrheitsgehalt or truth-content, distinct from its Sachgehalt or material
content—its subject matter (theme plus plot) plus arrangement of words.15 While
embodied in the Sachgehalt and only analytically distinct from it—“the more
significant the work, the more inconspicuously and intimately its truth content
is bound up with its material content,”16 a successful work’s Wahrheitsgehalt is its
embodiment and presentation of the vicissitudes of an aptly attentive subject
to the Sachgehalt throughout the subject’s alternations of mood, perception, and
thought, vicissitudes marked in the successful work by both a fullness of modulated
attention and a constitutive incompleteness arising out of an insuperable gap
between the discursive human subject and the course of nature as a whole. Hence,
as Beatrice Hanssen puts it, the achievement of Wahrheitsgehalt, in presenting these
vicissitudes, runs
counter to the poetical ideal of ever attaining a revealed language of plenitude.
…It [offers] a philosophical anamnesis of nature, a figure suppressed in Hegel’s
philosophy of spirit, …a radically different mode of recollection [from that of
Plato or Hegel] consist[ing] of a reflection to the second power in which reflection
pondered its own negativity and finitude.17

idea that criticism and philosophy should themselves be poetically organized is prominent,
however, in the fragments of Friedrich Schlegel, and it is developed by Benjamin at length in
his doctoral dissertation “The Concept of Criticism in German Romanticism.”
14
Menninghaus (2002, p. 49), citing Benjamin’s “The Concept of Criticism in German
Romanticism,” SW I, pp. 151ff and SW I, p. 146.
15
See Benjamin (2002b, p. 297); GS 1, 125.
16
Ibid.
17
Hanssen (2002, pp. 141-42).
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The direct argument of the 1914-15 essay on Hölderlin turns on close
comparisons between Hölderlin’s second draft of a lyric that describes the stance of
the poet, “The Poet’s Courage [Dichtermut]”, 1801, and his immediate revision of
it, “Timidity [Blödigkeit]”, also 1801. These comparisons emphasize the relatively
dogmatic, assertational character of the earlier version, contrasted with the more
open, processual, experience-related, living, and modulating character of the later
version. Thus Benjamin remarks that the earlier version foregrounds “mythology”
over “perceptual world formation,” as though the thought of the poem were
formed first, via reading and general reflections alone, independently of perceptual
experience. Hence Hölderlin in the earlier version is caught up in “grasping at
externals,” and “the indeterminacy of the shaping figure …dissolves the figure of
the poet,” insofar as we are unable or less able to recognize in the development
any modulated alternations on the part of a plausibly living speaker. The Parcae
or Fates who are invoked are “related [verwandt]” as it were observationally, or
introduced as symbols, rather than being in any way present in experience. The
poet simply “reaches with both hands into an alien world order, grabs at people
and God to raise within him his own courage.” The result is an isolated, static
image manifesting “a nonperceptual conception of life, an unmythic, destiny-less
concept of life stemming from a spiritually exiguous sphere.” In the later version,
in contrast, “the gods and the living are bound together,” in alike living within
fateful life processes, without orienting certainties. The Parcae are “recognized
[bekannt]” as similar to the poet and the people, rather than invoked or presented
as symbolic spiritual others. “At the center of the poem men, heavenly ones,
and princes—crashing down from their old orders, as it were, are linked to one
another.” “A structuring movement” of modulation in thoughts, perceptions,
and reflections on the part of an attentive, nondogmatic, and recognizably living
subject runs “from verse to verse.” “The traditional and simple superiority of
mythology is transcended” in favor of genuineness of presentation of the poet
bound within the destiny of a “situation” [Lage] wherein attention and reflection
are possible, even skillfully achievable, but never completable.18
These comparisons are developed on the basis of an initial general poetic
theory that centers on the concept of das Gedichtete, the poetized. Benjamin
defines this, initially somewhat paradoxically, as “the particular and unique sphere
in which the task and precondition [Aufgabe and Voraussetzung] of the poem

18

All quotations in this paragraph are from Benjamin (2002, pp. 23-27); GS II, pp. 109-14.
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lie.”19 The air of paradox diminishes somewhat if “of the poem” is emphasized in
this sentence. That is to say, for any particular poem, there is a distinctive situation
of a worldly subject undergoing a course of experience that is to-be-addressed
or worked through.20 That there is such some such situation is, as Benjamin
says, a precondition for any particular poem, and the poem, in turn, has the task
of working it through. Hence it is true both that “the task is derived from the
poem itself ”—that is, from the situation to be addressed on which it distinctively
focuses, and “the task”---that it is to work through this—“is also to be understood
as the precondition of the poem.”21 Benjamin describes the situation of a subject
in the world that is to-be-worked through as “the intellectual-perceptual [geistiganschaulich] structure of the world to which the poem bears witness [die geistiganschauliche Struktur derjenigen Welt, von der das Gedicht zeugt].”22 Here the
term “world” [Welt]” indicates, as in Heidegger’s contrast between world [Welt]
and earth [Erde], not either nature or the material stuff of the universe as a whole,
but rather a course of experience within a situation. Something has happened
to or for an experiencing subject, over some period of time, within a situation,
and this something that has happened—the intellectual-perceptual content of
this situated experience, an initially perplexing course of perceptions, reflections,
emotions, and attitudes—is to be addressed, worked through, and brought to
clarity. It is the situation of the subject in the world or the full content of the
subject’s experience that the poem takes as both its subject matter (precondition)
and its material to be worked through (task).
Hence the “’truth’ [of the poem], which the most serious artists so insistently
claim for their creations, shall be understood as the objectivity [Gegenständlichkeit]
of their production, as the fulfillment [Erfüllung] of the artistic task in each case.23
The poem, that is, achieves its truthfulness or fulfillment when it embodies
fullness of attention to its [geistig-anschaulich] experienced object, without lapsing
into shirking, reverie, or cliché. Perceptual content, thought, and emotional
stance within a worldly situation are modulated. There is developing content
that is presented over the course of time of the poem, and this presentation of
developing content within the poem attends to, works though, and intensifies, in
Ibid., p. 18; GS II, p. 105.
Compare the discussion of working through as the task of literary art in Eldridge (2008,
pp. 111-12, 119).
21
Benjamin (2002, p. 18); GS II, p. 105.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid., p. 19; GS II, p. 106.
19
20
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being free from distractions and irrelevancies, the course of experience within
a worldly situation that was to be worked through. The poem achieves, that
is to say, a “synthetic unity of the intellectual and perceptual orders,”24 in that
the course of thoughts, the course of perceptions, and the course of emotional
stances are apt to one another. There is an achievement of fullness of attention
on the part of an experiencing subject, embodied in “the fundamental aesthetic
unity of form and content,”25 where “aesthetic unity” indicates an appropriate
modulated and developed relation among elements that remain distinct from one
another as moments of the experience.
This amounts, in turn, to the achievement of fuller life as an attentive subject.
“For the creator, the idea of the task is always life. …In [the poetized] life
determines itself through the poem, the task through the solution [bestimmt sich
das Leben durch das Gedicht, die Aufgabe durch die Lösung].”26 That is, the life
of the subject takes on more intensity, a shape of fuller attentiveness, through the
composition of the poem, and that very solution in turn characterizes and reveals
the problem situation that was to be worked through. “(For task and solution
can be separated only in the abstract.) [(Denn Aufgabe und Lösung sind nur in
abstracto trennbar,)]”27 Insofar as a successful poem—one that avoids shirking,
reverie, and cliché—achieves an “intensity of the coherence of the perceptual and
intellectual elements” as opposed to “a slack extension of feeling” [eine schlaffe
Ausdehnung des Gefuhls],28 “a judgment, even if unprovable [zu beweisen], can
be justified [zu begrunden],”29 insofar as a critic may similarly work through in an
attentive modulated way the experience of the diverse elements of the poem.30
This kind of criticism itself poetically unfolds the composed content of the
poem in the interest of fullness of attention to it. Both the poem and criticism as
unfolding commentary aim at and can possess not truth as correspondence to a

Ibid.
Ibid.
26
Ibid., pp. 19-20; GS II, p. 107.
27
Ibid., p. 19; GS II, p. 107
28
As David Wellbery usefully notes, “Benjamin repudiates the vitalist ideology of immediate
expression which animates virtually of post-Diltheyan Literaturwissenschaft,” focusing instead
on the work as composed expression, more in the manner of New Criticism than of any form
of biographical criticism (1986, p. 27).
29
Benjamin (2002, pp. 20, 21); GS II, 107, 108.
30
Two important articles that develop this conception of critical working through, altogether
independently of Benjamin’s work, are Isenberg (1949) and Cavell (1969).
24
25
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given object, but rather what David Wellbery aptly describes as “emphatic truth”
in the fulfillment via composition of the poem’s task.31 This emphatic truth in
the service of fuller life, achieved in and through the work, is the aim of literary,
philosophical, and critical work as such.
Richard Eldridge
Swarthmore College
reldrid1@swarthmore.edu
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